Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.
Introduction
The vast majority of firms that operate in advanced countries are small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs). Therefore, SMEs' competitiveness significantly affects the competitive position of the country's economy as a whole. The concentration of SMEs' activities on domestic market leads to the bounded business vision. Combined with the asymmetric information about the profit opportunities abroad, this fact tends to limit the diversification of SMEs' investments in an international context. Consequently they appear to be more directly affected by the national corporate tax reform than is the case with large multinational firms. On the other hand, SMEs have quite often been the primary target group of such an investment promotion policy (Hendricks, Amit and Whistler, 1997; Chen, Lee and Mintz, 2002; Devereux, Griffith and Klemm, 2004) . According to Coyne (1995) , SMEs are generally more responsive to domestic tax incentives than large ones. Taxes may play a more important role in the cost structure of SMEs because they do not have the financial and human capacity to developed sophisticated tax avoidance strategies.
Some EU countries including the UK have traditionally had lower tax rates for SMEs, whereas such a corporate tax reduction does not exist in countries like Austria, Finland and Germany at all (see Table 1 ). Although it is disputable, those countries that provide fiscal incentives and preferential tax treatment to SMEs claim that they (i) create a large number of jobs and (ii) enhance the level of entrepreneurship, which implies flexibility, speed, risk-taking and innovation (Chen, Lee and Mintz, 2002) . A further reason for the tax policy attention paid to the SMEs is that they represent "an important breeding ground for large, profitable, tax-paying employers of the future and [experience] high growth rates in comparison to large enterprises" (Hendricks, Amit and Whistler, 1997, p. 1) .
The definition of SMEs for tax purpose also differs from one country to another. In the UK SMEs are generally those firms that yield profits between GBP 50,000 and GBP 300,000 annually. For the limited years from 2000 to 2002, Ireland also had a corporate tax rate of 12.5% for SMEs. Yet the total trading income on which this reduced rate was imposed changed from € 63,500 (2000) to € 254,000 (2001) . France has recently introduced a special tax rule for SMEs but in a rather limited manner: those companies that realise a maximum turnover of € 7,630,000 and at least 75% of whose capital is continuously owned by individuals or companies satisfying the same conditions are subject to corporate tax at a reduced rate of 15% (2004) on the proportion of the taxable profit that does not exceed € 38,120 (Chen, Lee and Mintz, 2002 ; KPMG Corporate Tax Rate Survey for various years from 2000 to 2004).
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The statutory corporate tax rate is clearly important in calculating the overall tax burden. However, this tax rate does not, in itself, establish the ultimate tax burden on the firms' investment activity. Equally crucial are the effects of the depreciation and other investment promotion provisions that determine the tax base (Sørensen, 2004) . In the practice of corporate tax policy different tax depreciation rules are employed that do not typically ensure the so-called true economic depreciation (Samuelson, 1964; Sinn, 1987) . Furthermore, their generosity has been extended to stimulate private investment.
On the other hand, depreciation based upon historical cost is undervalued during inflationary phases, as the real cost of depreciation of today's assets is underestimated when the asset base is measured in nominal term (Ott, 1984; Cohen and Hasset, 1999; Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000) . There have been a number of attempts to estimate the current value of a capital good on the basis of indexation (Feldstein, 1979; Feldstein and Summers, 1979; Hulten and Wykoff, 1996) . "Such a method would provide for equitable accounting whether inflation rates were high or low.
[But] many agree that it would be too complicated to compute the rate of inflation for the multitude of different assets. The idea of using an overall index was rejected on the grounds that some assets such as computers actually [decline] in price over time and this method would bias investment towards those assets that increased in price" (Evans, 1983, p.150) .
A series of corporate tax reforms carried out in EU countries (like Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland and the UK) have generally entailed lower statutory tax rates and a reduction in generous tax depreciation provisions (including investment tax allowances, generous geometric-degressive as well as free and accelerated depreciation) (see Table 1 and 2). To a large extent this process has been triggered by the fierce tax competition among EU members aimed at attracting capital, in particular direct investment of multinational firms (Keen, 1991; Janeba, 1995; Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000; Devereux and Griffith, 2003) .
The tax-rate-cut-cum-base-broadening reform "has interesting effects on firms' investment incentives. Most empirical research on the impact of taxes on investment and -most theoretical work on tax competition -has focussed on the impact of taxes at the margin [...] . Typically corporate income taxes raise the cost of capital -the required rate of return on an investment -and therefore act as a disincentive to invest.
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The two aspects of these reforms have offsetting effects on this disincentive: the lower tax rate typically increases the incentive to invest, while the lower allowance decreases it. The combined effect depends on the details of each reform" (Devereux, Griffith and Klemm, 2002) . Table 1 Statutory corporate tax rates (%) for SMEs in the selected EU countries in the case of profit retention Austria Finland France Germany Ireland UK 1980 1985 1986 1988 1989 1990 1992 1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  2001  2002  2003   55  55  55  55  55  55  55  55  55  30  30  30  30  30  34  34  34  34  34  34  34  34  34  34   43  43  43  43  43  43  33  33  33  33  25  23  19  25  25  25  28  28  28  28  29  29  29  29   50  50  50  50  50  45  45  39  39  37  34  34 1 The principal idea of the user cost of capital approach is that a firm will invest until the point at which the marginal product of capital is equal to the cost of capital -so that, at the margin, the project just breaks even. As investment increases, the marginal product declines, resulting in a unique profitmaximising investment level (Hall and Jorgenson, 1967; Auerbach, 1983; King and Fullerton, 1984; Sinn, 1987; Devereux and Griffith, 2003; Gordon, Kalambokidis and Slemrod, 2004; Razin, Sadka and Nam, 2005) . 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita20%+sld10% ita9%+sld10% ita9%+sld10% ita9%+sld10% ita9%+sld10% ita9%+sld10% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd37.5% gdd37.5% gdd37.5% gdd37.5% gdd37.5% gdd37.5% gdd37.5% gdd37.5% gdd37.5% gdd37.5% gdd25% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% gdd30% sld10% sld10% sld10% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% sld15%(6yrs)+10%(1yr) sld15%(6yrs)+10%(1yr) sld15%(6yrs)+10%(1yr) sld15%(6yrs)+10%(1yr) sld15%(6yrs)+10%(1yr) sld15%(6yrs)+10%(1yr) sld15%(6yrs)+10%(1yr) sld15%(6yrs)+10%(1yr) sld15%(6yrs)+10%(1yr) sld20% sld20% sld20% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% fd100% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% gdd25% ad30%+sld10%(7yr) (gdd25%) ad30%+sld10%(7yr) (gdd25%) ad30%+sld10%(7yr) (gdd25%) ad30%+sld10%(7yr) (gdd25%) ad30%+sld10%(7yr) (gdd25%) ad30%+sld10%(7yr) (gdd25%) Note: ita = investment tax allowance, sld = straight-line depreciation, gdd = geometric-degressive depreciation and fd = free depreciation, ad = accelerated depreciation. The depreciation methods and rates shown in parentheses are standard depreciation rules applicable for the investment in equipment. Source: Chen, Lee and Mintz (2002) , Taxation, SMEs and Entrepreneuship, OECD, Paris; Ifo Institute for Economic Research.
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A similar examination can also be carried out based on the present value model (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Nam and Radulescu, 2005) . In other words this study argues that discrete investment choices of profit-maximising SMEs are dependent on the post-tax net present value. Without taxation, the net present value (NPV) is equal to the present value of future gross return, discounted at an appropriate interest rate less investment cost. After the introduction of tax on corporate income, the present value of the asset generated from an investment amounts to the sum of present value of net return (gross return less taxes) and tax savings led by an incentive depreciation provision. An investment project is considered to be profitable when the NPV is positive. A superior feature of such a model is that one can adequately consider different accounting methods of tax depreciation when inflation prevails.
Ceteris paribus two tax determinants (corporate tax rate and depreciation rule) vary in the model simulation, while other relevant parameters such as interest rate, economic depreciation, inflation rate, etc. are assumed to remain unchanged. Furthermore, it is a general belief that SMEs have limited access to capital markets, both nationally and internationally, in part because of the perception of higher risk, informational barriers and the involvement in smaller projects, etc. As a result, SMEs have quite often been unable to obtain long-term finance in the form of term debt and equity, and a larger part of their investments have traditionally been self-financed.
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Only in an exceptional case when tax depreciation corresponds to Samuelson's true economic depreciation and its calculation is based on current replacement cost of capital is the tax neutrality guaranteed. In spite of the fact that the inflation rate has been gradually decreased in Europe the low rate still appears to matter for the calculation of the tax base and SMEs' investment decisions. The changes in incentive effects of corporate tax policy measures in an inflationary economy can ideally be reflected in an international comparison when the country rankings are constructed according to the calculated nominal NPV. The study investigates the changes of tax burden on capital caused by the corporate tax reform in selected EU nations since the beginning of 1980s.
Nominal Net Present Value Model
The generosity of different types of tax concessions in combination with corporate tax rates can be measured on the basis of a net present value model. Under the assumptions 7 that (i) an equity-financed investment generates an infinite stream of future gross return and (ii) this return exponentially declines at a given rate α (0 < α < 1), Samuelson (1964) demonstrated in his fundamental theorem of tax-rate invariance that corporate income taxation does not affect firms' investment decisions at all, when true economic depreciation (TED) -the negative change in value of the asset in the course of time -is deducted from an expected gross stream of return when calculating tax profits. And the TED rate is the same rate at which the gross return declines in the course of time: i.e. the TED rate = α (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Sinn, 1987; Alvarez, Kanniainen and Södersten, 2000; Nam and Radulescu, 2005) .
In an economy with the constant inflation rate π but without taxation, an equity-financed investment of a profit-maximising SME is on the margin of acceptance at the year of investment, when
where A 0 e -(α-π+µ)u means nominal gross return at year u generated by an investment costing C at time 0, which is discounted by the nominal interest rate µ = r + π (0 < r < 1). In this case, the sum of annual gross return exponentially decreases at α but increases at π in the course of time. In such an equilibrium technically expressed in equation (1), inflation does not play any role for the investment decision and NPV (= PV 0 -C) amounts to zero. Such a steady-state condition usually plays the basis role for the further analyses on corporate tax systems. In the case of adopting geometric-degressive depreciation and if its calculation is made based on the current cost accounting system, 3 nominal present value can be expressed as
where δ indicates the geometric-degressive depreciation rate and Ce -(δ-π)u shows the (nominal) net book value of capital good in the period u. Therefore, with δ = δ* = α nPV(t)* 0 gdd,cur = PV 0 = C in equilibrium, the so-called tax neutrality is guaranteed 4 and inflation does not disturb the investment decision at all. When the historical accounting method 5 is applied as the usual case in practice
where Ce -δu shows the net book value of capital good in the period u in this case.
When δ* = α, a fictitious gain (FG) in nominal present value with geometric-degressive depreciation emerges through the adoption of historical accounting method since nPV(t) 0 gdd*,his is larger than nPV(t) 0 gdd*,cur .
(4) FG gdd* = nPV(t) 0 gdd*,his -nPV(t) 0 gdd*,cur = nPV(t) 0 gdd*,his -PV 0
In the case of employing the historical cost accounting method, the nominal present value of the asset with straight-line depreciation at time 0 is
where Γ indicates the normal tax life of a capital good. The true investment promotion (TIP) of corporate taxation system accompanied by straight-line depreciation takes place when nPV(t) 0 sld,his -C > FG gdd* . In the context of free depreciation the sum of C can be fully written off in the first year. When employing this depreciation method, the nominal present value of asset at year 0 is
TIP of free depreciation takes place in spite of applying historical accounting method when nominal NPV with free depreciation (= nPV(t) 0 fd,his -C) is larger than FG gdd* . Furthermore, a certain percentage share of C referred to as investment tax allowance can be deducted from gross profit in the first year when calculating the tax base. Investment tax allowance is commonly applied in combination with straight-line depreciation. As a consequence, this type of tax incentive provides possibilities of depreciating the value which is significantly higher than the original investment cost of a capital good.
With investment tax allowance, nominal present value of asset at year 0 is
where β indicates the rate of investment tax allowance (0 < β < 1). TIP is expected when nPV(t) 0 ita,his -C > FG gdd* . Accelerated depreciation is also combined with the straight-line depreciation method.
Accelerated depreciation expense -as a certain percentage share (σ) of C -is taxdeductible in the first year of a capital good's tax life (0 < σ < 1). Consequently, the total depreciation expense in the first year amounts to σC + C/Γ and the total tax life of a capital good is reduced correspondingly from Γ to Ω, where Ω = (1 -σ)Γ. In the case of adopting the historical accounting method the nominal present value of the asset with accelerated depreciation at year 0 is
Analogously TIP with accelerated depreciation exists when nPV(t) 0 ad,his -C > FG gdd* .
Major Results of Model Simulation
The study investigates the corporate tax reform and its effect on SME's nominal NPV in six selected EU nations -Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland and the UKfor the period of 1980-2003. Two tax policy measures -corporate tax rate and depreciation provision -change in the model simulation, while other relevant parameters like interest rate, economic depreciation, inflation rate, etc. are given. For the calculation statutory corporate tax rates and depreciation rules are applied for the individual years, which are demonstrated in Tables 1 and 2 . Further assumptions made in the simulations are A 0 = 100; r = 4%, α = δ* = 20%, C = PV 0 = 416.7, Γ = 10 years for equipment whereas π varies from 2% to 4% and 6%. As had been anticipated a priori, the development of FG gdd* values were positively correlated to t and π in the observed period (Tables 3 to 5 ). In general a constant increase of π led to a progressively rising FG gdd* , although t remained unchanged. Moreover, the extent of FG gdd* change (i.e. increase and decrease) caused by the variation of t generally became more apparent, when the assumed π got higher. As shown in terms of mean values in Tables 3 to 5 , the corporate tax reduction introduced in the selected countries also contributed to the gradual decrease of FG gdd* , which is, however, accompanied by the slightly increasing standard deviation values in the course of time. deviation 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Common assumptions: A 0 = 100, r = 4%, α = δ* =20% and C = PV 0 = 416.7. Source: Table 1 and own calculations. Table 4 Effects of corporate tax rate change on SME's fictitious gain (FG gdd* ) when π = 4% and δ* = α: investment in equipment Common assumptions: A 0 = 100, r = 4%, α = δ* =20% and C = PV 0 = 416.7. Source: Table 1 and own calculations. Table 5 Effects of corporate tax rate change on SME's fictitious gain (FG gdd* ) when π = 6% and δ* = α: investment in equipment Common assumptions: A 0 = 100, r = 4%, α = δ* =20% and C = PV 0 = 416.7. Source: Table 1 and own calculations.
In most of the investigated countries (except Germany and France) the investment promotion effect of corporate tax system measured in terms of TIP (= NPV with tax depreciation rule subtracted by FG gdd* ) continued to decline. Regardless of assumed π, this fact is well illustrated by the gradually decreasing mean and standard deviation of TIP values in the course of time (Tables 6-8 ). Moreover the difference between the highest and the lowest mean value and the corresponding difference of standard deviation grew with π, although their growth appears to be rather moderate. deviation 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 deviation 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 43.27 (1) In addition one can well identify different ITP development types among the investigated EU nations. Austria and Finland belong to the same country group for which those values declined in the course of time but with significant fluctuations in the 1990s. A drop of TIP value at the end of 1990s is also comparable in these two countries (Figures 1), although the decrease is mainly triggered by the generosity reduction of β from 20% to 9% in Austria and δ from 30% to 25% in Finland.
Ireland and the UK also had a quite similar TIP development pattern in the past. A rapid reduction of its value took place in Ireland in 1992 and two years later also in the UK (Figure 2) . The major reason for this significant change was the substitution of free depreciation to less generous straight-line depreciation (with 7 years of tax life) in Ireland and to geometric-degressive depreciation (with δ = 25%) in the UK, while t remained unchanged in both reform years (40% in Ireland and 33% in the UK). In the period before as well as after these 'big bang' reform years mentioned above the TIP values remained stable and developed comparably in both countries.
The model simulation also suggests that the SME-specific lower corporate tax rates can lead -with the given uniform depreciation rule -to less significant investment promotion effects than is the case with the normal statutory rates, since the reduction of t also causes a decrease in tax savings (Table 9 ). In spite of the lower tax rates, the TIP values for SMEs were smaller than those for large firms in the UK in the period between 1980 and 1997. Yet the combination of lower tax rate with the more generous SME-specific accelerated depreciation (instead of a geometric-degressive one for large firms) has created larger scale promotion effects since 1998. Table 9 Comparison of true investment promotion (TIP) effect between SMEs and large firms in the UK: investment in equipment
SMEs
Large firms π=2% π=4% π=6% π=2% π=4% π=6% 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Common assumptions: A 0 = 100, r = 4%, α = δ* = 20%, C = PV 0 = 416.7 and Γ = 10 years. Source: Tables 1, 2 and 6-8; own calculations.
France and Germany are countries whose individual TIP development patterns are quite unique. For example, French TIP values remained quite stable at a lower level until 1993 but at a higher level since 1994. A fast jump of TIP in 1994 was led by a δ increase from 25% to 37.5% while maintaining t = 33%. German TIP values grew rapidly thanks to the increase in δ from 25% (1980) to 30% (1981) by given t = 56%. Thereafter the TIP value remained quite constant, which however sank to the level below zero in 2001, due to the simultaneous reduction of t from 40% to 25% and the change of geometricdegressive depreciation with δ = 30% to straight-line one with Γ = 10 years ( Figure 3 ). ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( Tables 6 to 8 . With π = 2% the Austrian corporate tax system with investment tax allowance maintained the leading position throughout all of the considered years. Under the assumption of π = 4% and 6%, however, the country's first rank was shared with other nations like Ireland (1989-91) and France (1999 France ( -2003 . A number of corporate tax reforms did not change the ranking much. This fact applies most apparently for those reforms -in particular the reduction of t -carried out in Finland (1986 , 1990 -3, 1996 ), Germany (1989 , 1993 ), France (1985 , 1989 -90 and 1992 ), Ireland (1997 , and the UK (1983-84, 1986-88, 1995-96 and 2002) . Despite numerous amendments of the corporate tax system, the competitive position of individual countries remained less favourable in these reform years.
On the other hand, some significant consequences of reforms of a positive and also a negative kind are observed in France, Ireland and the UK. As illustrated above, the increase of δ from 25% to 37.5% in 1994 (while keeping t = 33.33%) improved France's position from the last to the second. Irish 1992 big bang reform which reduced t from 43% to 40% and switched the traditional free depreciation to straight-line depreciation (with seven years of tax life), made the country's competitive position worse off from the second to the fourth. A more serious negative consequence was led by British 1994 reform: the change from free to geometric-degressive depreciation (δ = 25%) in 1995 -but maintaining specific t = 25% for SMEs -demolished the country's position. The further reduction ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( ( 
Conclusion
For the selected six EU countries this study examines the effects of corporate tax reforms on SMEs' investment decisions implemented since the beginning of the 1980s. These reforms entailed lower statutory tax rates accompanied by the reduction of generous tax depreciation provisions. Among them the UK has traditionally had reduced tax rates for SMEs. Under the specific assumptions of relevant parameters, the tax incentive and/or burden on investment activity is measured in terms of nominal net present value (NPV).
Major findings of the model simulation can be summarised as follows: • The application of the historical cost accounting system (instead of the current cost accounting method) in the inflationary economy when calculating tax depreciation amounts creates the fictitious gain in nominal NPV (FG gdd* ), although the equity of tax depreciation and TED -the important condition for tax neutrality -is assumed. In general this type of gain decreased gradually in the period between 1980-2003, since t and π continued to sink in the investigated EU nations.
• A down-sloping development is also observed for the TIP value (= nominal NPV with tax depreciation scheme minus FG gdd* ). France with an increasing trend was the only exception. In addition, different nation groups are identified, based on the TIP values for SMEs in the individual countries. A clear similarity of the TIP development pattern prevails in Austria and Finland, on the one hand, as well as in Ireland and the UK, on the other. Apart from France, Germany also had a unique feature.
• Since SMEs are the majority of firms in the advanced countries, their competitiveness significantly affects the competitiveness of an individual nation's economy as a whole. According to the international ranking constructed also on the basis of annual TIP values, the Austrian investment tax allowance system provided the most favourable condition for SMEs in the survey years, when π is 2%. Yet the country shared its first position with Ireland and France if the same rate increases to 4% or 6%. A series of corporate tax reforms made in Germany and Finland were not able to enhance their low ranks much. In contrast to the positive reform consequence like the French case in 1994, Irish and British tax policy interventions, which replaced free depreciation, destroyed their leading competitive position in the first half of 1990s.
